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STUDYING THE “NEW” CIVIL JUDGES
ANNA E. CARPENTER, JESSICA K. STEINBERG, COLLEEN F.
SHANAHAN, AND ALYX MARK*
We know very little about the people and institutions that make up the
bulk of the United States civil justice system: state judges and state courts.
Our understanding of civil justice is based primarily on federal litigation
and the decisions of appellate judges. Staggeringly little legal scholarship
focuses on state courts and judges. We simply do not know what most
judges are doing in their day-to-day courtroom roles or in their roles as
institutional actors and managers of civil justice infrastructure. We know
little about the factors that shape and influence judicial practices, let alone
the consequences of those practices for courts, litigants, and the public.
From top to bottom, we can describe and theorize about our existing civil
justice system in only piecemeal ways. Given legal scholarship’s nearcomplete focus on federal civil courts, the stories we tell about the civil
justice system may be based on assumptions and models that only apply in
the rarefied world of federal court. Meanwhile, state judges and courts—
which handle ninety-nine percent of all civil cases—are ripe for theoretical
and empirical exploration.
In response, we call for more research aimed at increasing our
understanding of state civil courts and judges and offer a theoretical
framework to support this work, one that reflects how state courts differ
from federal courts. This framework is grounded in a core fact of American
civil justice, one both easily observed and largely overlooked: the majority
of parties in state civil courts are unrepresented. Given this new pro se
reality, our theoretical framework identifies four novel assumptions to guide
future research: (1) the adversary process is disappearing; (2) most state
court business is still conducted through in-person interactions between
judges and parties; (3) the judicial role is ethically ambiguous in pro se
cases; and (4) a largely static body of written law has not kept pace with the
evolving and dynamic issues facing state courts. Building on the growth of
empiricism and empirically grounded theory in traditional legal scholarship
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and access to justice research, we call on scholars to develop theory and
gather data to map the new reality of civil justice and judging in America,
and suggest questions to guide future research.
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INTRODUCTION
Americans turn to state courts to manage personal and business
problems of all types. We rely on state courts to end failing
relationships, manage the custody of children, and gain protection from
violence. We often turn to these courts when faced with broken
commitments, failed deals, or damaged property. Increasingly, people
are pulled into state court litigation because they have fallen behind on
credit card, mortgage, or rent payments. State civil courts are the
primary place where most Americans interact with the civil justice
system; these courts and the judges who preside over and administer
them sit at the heart of our civic, economic, and social life.
Unlike other fundamental systems like health care and education,
we know very little about our state courts—from what goes on in local
courtrooms and clerks’ offices to court administration at the state level.1
We lack even the most rudimentary knowledge of the most powerful
1.
Stephen C. Yeazell, Courting Ignorance: Why We Know So Little About
Our Most Important Courts, 143 DÆDALUS, J. AM. ACAD. ARTS & SCI. 129, 129
(2014).
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actors in this system—judges, including what happens inside their
courts, and why. This lack of knowledge persists, despite legal
scholarship’s ongoing investments and interest in empiricism and the
recent burst of access to justice research across multiple disciplines.
The lack of information about state civil courts and judges makes it
difficult to develop theoretical expectations about how they operate, to
evaluate those expectations empirically, and to develop policies and
practices to improve the justice system. The state court knowledge
deficit is no secret; a smattering of scholars have identified and
bemoaned it over the past thirty years.2 Yet legal scholarship continues
to focus almost exclusively on federal courts, federal judges, and a
particular judicial function in those courts: decision making in appellate
cases.3 Though federal courts decide complex cases and articulate the

2.
Since the early 1980s, legal scholars have intermittently noted and
critiqued the lack of information about state civil justice systems. See, e.g., Theodore
Eisenberg, Negotiation, Lawyering, and Adjudication: Kritzer on Brokers and Deals,
19 L. & SOC. INQUIRY 275, 278 (1994) (“We know, for example, much more about tort
cases filed in federal court than we do about such cases in state court.”); Thomas J.
Miles & Cass R. Sunstein, The New Legal Realism, 75 U. CHI. L. REV. 831, 835 n.17
(2008) (“[S]tate courts are a fertile place for study, and little has been done to date.”);
Judith Resnik, Fairness in Numbers: A Comment on AT&T v. Concepcion, Wal-Mart
v. Dukes, and Turner v. Rogers, 125 HARV. L. REV. 78, 158 (2011) (citing a lack of
empirical data about the effects of given procedures in a civil justice context); Norman
W. Spaulding, Due Process Without Judicial Process?: Antiadversarialism in American
Legal Culture, 85 FORDHAM L. REV. 2249, 2251–52 (2017) (noting civil procedure
scholars “focus intensely and almost exclusively on the bare fraction of civil cases
decided in federal courts, leaving largely unexamined the norms and rules governing
the tens of millions of cases affecting the lives of ordinary Americans in state courts”).
In 1983, Herbert Jacob described a burst of scholarly activity focused on state criminal
courts following the ascendance of legal realism but noted that “[b]y contrast, our
knowledge of the way trial courts deal with civil matters is scant.” Herbert Jacob, Trial
Courts in the United States: The Travails of Exploration, 17 L. & SOC’Y REV. 407, 408–
13 (1983). Jacob’s nearly forty-year-old observations hold true today.
3.
Ethan J. Leib, Localist Statutory Interpretation, 161 U. PA. L. REV. 897
(2013).
[L]egal scholars have almost universally ignored the law in local courts,
favoring the study of federal courts and state appellate courts. Much like the
drunk man who looks under the lamppost for his lost keys at night because
it is the only place he has the light to see, so too the legal scholar often
studies published cases because they are available from databases at her
fingertips. Id. at 898–99.
See also RICHARD A. POSNER, HOW JUDGES THINK 19 (2010) (“There are many positive
. . . theories of judicial behavior. Their primary focus is, as one would expect, on
explaining judges’ decisions.”); Michele Cotton, When Judges Don't Follow the Law:
Research and Recommendations, 19 CUNY L. REV. 57, 57–58 (2015); Theodore
Eisenberg, The Origins, Nature, and Promise of Empirical Legal Studies and a
Response to Concerns, 2011 U. ILL. L. REV. 1713, 1734; Miles & Sunstein, supra note
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final word on essential doctrinal and procedural questions, these courts
currently handle less than one percent of America’s annual civil
caseload.4 To ignore state civil courts is to ignore ninety-nine percent of
the cases in our civil justice system. When legal scholars (and social
scientists) do turn to state courts and judges, they tend to focus on
criminal dockets and state appellate courts.5
The data we do have about state courts point to a radical and
ongoing transformation in the civil justice system, a transformation
both easy to observe and largely overlooked.6 State civil court dockets
are now dominated by lay people who manage their civil justice
problems without the assistance of a lawyer, a group one of us has
called the “unrepresented majority.”7 An estimate based on recent data
suggests that three-quarters of all state civil cases—at least 15.5 million
2, at 837 (noting much of the New Legal Realist empirical scholarship focuses on
federal court decisions).
4.
In 2015, 20.4 million civil cases were filed in state courts (this includes
15.4 million general civil and 5 million domestic relations cases). See NAT’L CTR. FOR
STATE COURTS, EXAMINING THE WORK OF STATE COURTS: AN OVERVIEW OF 2015 STATE
COURT CASELOADS 3 (2016) [hereinafter NAT’L CTR. FOR STATE COURTS, EXAMINING
THE WORK OF STATE COURTS], [https://perma.cc/6CKF-BF72]. The same year,
281,608 civil cases were filed in federal district courts. See Federal Judicial Caseload
Statistics 2015, U.S. CTS., [https://perma.cc/SF62-FAZX]. Thus, federal civil filings
make up just over one percent of all civil filings in the United States.
5.
See Theodore Eisenberg & Michael Heise, Plaintiphobia in State Courts
Redux? An Empirical Study of State Court Trials on Appeal, 12 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL
STUDS. 100, 1011 (2015) (study of state civil appeals and reversal rates where the
authors note, “[w]e know comparatively little about the relation between trial and
appellate court outcomes”); Jacob, supra note 2, at 408–13; Leib, supra note 3, at 898–
99.
6.
Jessica Steinberg made this point in a previous article that was the first to
comprehensively describe the breakdown in adversary procedure in state courts, with a
particular focus on the ethical conundrum facing state court judges. See Jessica K.
Steinberg, Adversary Breakdown and Judicial Role Confusion in “Small Case” Civil
Justice, 2016 BYU L. REV. 899 [hereinafter Steinberg, Adversary Breakdown]. Peter
Holland’s groundbreaking study of debt buyer lawsuits makes a similar point in the
context of this specific class of cases. As he argues, the data suggest there is no
adversary system in these cases, instead, there is a “shadow system” with little judicial
oversight, a system characterized by “mass produced” default judgments. See Peter A.
Holland, Junk Justice: A Statistical Analysis of 4,400 Lawsuits Filed by Debt Buyers,
26 LOY. CONSUMER L. REV. 179, 179 (2014).
7.
For rates of unrepresented parties in state courts, see NAT’L CTR. FOR
STATE COURTS, CIVIL JUSTICE INITIATIVE: THE LANDSCAPE OF CIVIL LITIGATION IN
STATE COURTS iv, 31–33 (2015) [hereinafter THE LANDSCAPE OF CIVIL LITIGATION],
[https://perma.cc/6FYL-XWNP]. For a review of recent research, see Jessica K.
Steinberg, Demand Side Reform in the Poor People’s Court, 47 CONN. L. REV. 741,
749–51 (2015) [hereinafter Steinberg, Demand Side]; Colleen F. Shanahan, Anna E.
Carpenter & Alyx Mark, Lawyers, Power, and Strategic Expertise, 93 DENV. L. REV.
469, 481–82, 508–12 (2016) [hereinafter Lawyers, Power, and Strategic Expertise].
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per year—involve at least one unrepresented party.8 This massive figure
reflects a complete reversal in the representation status of state court
litigants in less than three decades. Twenty-five years ago, nearly every
party in state court had a lawyer.9 Today, the vast majority represent
themselves.10
In response to the rise of unrepresented parties, the adversary
system in state courts has fundamentally changed. The leading authority
on state courts has called the adversary system in these courts an
“idealized picture” and an “illusion.”11 Our own research shows that
party control of litigation has fallen away and that judges are routinely
departing from the traditional, passive judicial role in varied and ad hoc
ways when they deal with pro se parties.12 One of us was the first to
point out that judges are behaving in ways that neither the law nor
ethical rules authorize.13 One was the first to create a formal taxonomy
of active judging behaviors.14 Another was the first to examine how
judges’ treatment of pretrial procedural requests defines pro se parties’
access to the hearing room.15 We have also studied the role judges play
in shaping how advocates develop and exercise legal expertise.16
8.
This estimate is based on National Center for State Courts data. It includes
civil and domestic cases and excludes traffic cases. Traffic cases make up by far the
largest portion of state court matters. In 2015, 15.4 million civil cases and 5 million
domestic relations/family cases were filed in state courts, for a total of 20.4 million
cases. See NAT’L CTR. FOR STATE COURTS, EXAMINING THE WORK OF STATE COURTS,
supra note 4, at 3. The most recent National Center data suggest at least 76% state civil
matters involve one unrepresented party. See THE LANDSCAPE OF CIVIL LITIGATION,
supra note 7, at iv. We arrive at the 15.5 million estimate by taking 76% of 20.4
million.
9.
See infra note 28 and accompanying text.
10.
See infra note 28 and accompanying text.
11.
THE LANDSCAPE OF CIVIL LITIGATION, supra note 7, at vi.
12.
See Anna E. Carpenter, Active Judging and Access to Justice, 93 NOTRE
DAME L. REV. 647, 649–50, 655–56 (2018) [hereinafter Carpenter, Active Judging]
(presenting data showing that, in a District of Columbia administrative court, judges
routinely depart from the passive norm but that practices vary in meaningful ways
within the court); Steinberg, Adversary Breakdown, supra note 6, at 901–03, 938, 940–
43 (arguing legal scholars have long studied and critiqued the active judicial role in
complex and public law litigation while ignoring the development of similar practices in
state civil courts; presenting examples on judicial departures from the passive role).
13.
See Steinberg, Adversary Breakdown, supra note 6.
14.
See Carpenter, supra note 12.
15.
Colleen F. Shanahan, The Keys to the Kingdom: Judges, Pre-Hearing
Procedure, and Access to Justice, 2018 WIS. L. REV. 215 [hereinafter Shanahan, Keys
to the Kingdom].
16.
Anna E. Carpenter, Alyx Mark & Colleen F. Shanahan, Trial and Error:
Lawyers and Nonlawyer Advocates, 42 L. & SOC. INQUIRY 1023 (2017) [hereinafter
Carpenter, Mark & Shanahan, Trial and Error] (study of lawyer and nonlawyer
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Judicial departures from the passive role, which we call “active
judging,” range from procedural adjustments, like asking questions to
authenticate evidence, to moves with substantive implications for case
outcomes, like raising new legal claims or defenses where parties have
failed to do so.17 It also includes judicial behavior outside the confines
of a hearing, from informal party interactions to judicial participation in
redefining court systems. At the same time, some state courts (led by
judges) are developing new programs and practices that empower other
actors (including nonlawyers) to assist unrepresented parties, often in
strong collaboration with outside organizations.18
We know that the adversary system and the judicial role are
changing in courts across the country, but we do not have the data to
say with any certainty how widespread such changes are, let alone to
understand their nature and effect. We cannot meaningfully describe
what most state civil court judges actually do in their day-to-day work,
much less the causes and consequences of this behavior. Our ignorance
stretches from the courtroom to the clerk’s office and beyond. Only by
piecing together disparate strands of research can we even begin to
identify the questions we should be asking. An entire field of study sits
almost completely unexplored.
In this article, we are intentionally pushing back on prevailing
wisdom about the study of courts and judges, which implicitly, and
sometimes explicitly, holds that only nonroutine or idiosyncratic cases

advocates representing employers in unemployment compensation appeals, finding
judges play a powerful role in shaping nonlawyer expertise).
17.
For early articles discussing the dilemma judges face in pro se cases and
suggesting techniques for handling these cases, see, e.g., Rebecca A. Albrecht et al.,
Judicial Techniques for Cases Involving Self-Represented Litigants, JUDGES’ J., Winter
2003, at 16, 18, 48 (2003); Russell Engler, And Justice for All–Including the
Unrepresented Poor: Revisiting the Roles of the Judges, Mediators, and Clerks, 67
FORDHAM L. REV. 1987, 1987, 2014, 2017 (1999) [hereinafter Engler, And Justice for
All]; Jona Goldschmidt, The Pro Se Litigant's Struggle for Access to Justice: Meeting
the Challenge of Bench and Bar Resistance, 40 FAM. CT. REV. 36, 36, 45–53 (2002).
18.
For the first national survey of civil legal services, see REBECCA
L. SANDEFUR & AARON C. SMYTH, AM. BAR FOUND., ACCESS ACROSS AMERICA: FIRST
REPORT OF THE CIVIL JUSTICE INFRASTRUCTURE MAPPING PROJECT, at v (2011),
[https://perma.cc/2XJQ-URD9] (“The existing civil legal assistance infrastructure is, in
effect, the output of many public-private partnerships, most of them on a small scale . .
. . Funding for civil legal assistance comes from a wide range of public and private
sources.”). For the most well-developed court-based lay assistance program, see
REBECCA L. SANDEFUR, & THOMAS M. CLARKE, ROLES BEYOND LAWYERS: SUMMARY,
RECOMMENDATIONS, AND RESEARCH REPORT OF AN EVALUATION OF THE NEW YORK
CITY COURT NAVIGATORS PROGRAM AND ITS THREE PILOT PROJECTS (2016),
[https://perma.cc/53HX-CQPV].
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are worthy of study.19 Instead, we argue that ignoring the routine, daily
work of our nation’s courts has left a massive gap in our understanding
of the civil justice system, a system that has real effects on the people
whose lives and well-being are at stake within it.20 Researchers have not
evaluated existing theories of judging and civil justice in state courts.
Our current theoretical models may be inadequate to explain the vast
majority of judicial and civil court activity in the United States.
The stories we tell about civil justice in America are likely based
on assumptions and models that may only apply in the rarefied world of
federal court. For example, current legal scholarship emphasizes the
“vanishing trial” and the rise of “privatized procedure.”21 While trials
are on the decline in state courts just as they are in federal courts, state
court litigation differs in important ways. In-person interactions
between judges and parties are still the primary means of conducting
business in state courts. Judges and parties routinely interact in open
court to process and dispose of litigation; few cases are resolved based
on written pleadings and motions.
Privatized procedure—where parties develop out-of-court
contractual arrangements to alter standard procedural regimes—belongs
almost exclusively to the realm of federal courts. The majority of lay
people who find themselves engaged in state court litigation are simply
not equipped to strategically manage procedures to advance their
interests. In the courtrooms we have observed, judges exert tight
control over procedure and case processing.22 In courts with few
lawyers, there is simply no one else with the requisite expertise to
wield the necessary procedural tools. The limited available research
19.
POSNER, supra note 3, at 19 (describing the author’s goal as the creation
of a “cogent, unified, realistic, and appropriately eclectic account of how judges
actually arrive at their decisions in nonroutine cases”). See also Katerina Linos &
Melissa Carlson, Qualitative Methods for Law Review Writing, 84 U. CHI. L. REV. 213,
214 (2017) (arguing that doctrinal tools lead scholars to analyze pathbreaking cases, but
noting that “sound generalizations about law and society” should not be based on an
analysis of such cases because they are “idiosyncratic,” and encouraging legal scholars
to use qualitative social science methods in their research on law and the legal system).
20.
Other scholars have noted the lack of data about the civil justice system
and its consequences. See, e.g., Eisenberg, supra note 3, at 1734; Resnik, supra note
2, at 158.
21.
See Marc Galanter, The Vanishing Trial: An Examination of Trials and
Related Matters in Federal and State Courts, 1 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUDS. 459, 459
(2004) (documenting the decline of civil trials in federal and state court); Judith Resnik,
The Privatization of Process: Requiem for and Celebration of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure at 75, 162 U. PA. L. REV. 1793 (2014) (describing and critiquing the
privatization of process in federal court).
22.
See Carpenter, supra note 12, at 687–90; Shanahan, supra note 15 at 103;
Steinberg, Adversary Breakdown, supra note 6, at 938–40.
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suggests prevailing stories about the evolving civil justice system do not
neatly map onto the state court context.
Even the recent growth of empirical access to justice research has
not reached the study of state civil judges and courts. Instead,
researchers have focused on legal needs and services.23 Access to
justice scholars have been the loudest voices regarding the plight of
unrepresented parties in state courts and promoting reform of courts
and judicial practices. But we have not seen calls for research aimed at
increasing our understanding of how judges behave and courts operate
in the existing civil justice system, or at analyzing the implementation
and effect of reforms. Instead, most scholars have focused on making
the normative case for change and offering prescriptions for reform.24
In this article, we make the case for a research agenda focused on
state courts and the judges who manage and work within them. In Part
I, we present a brief overview of the state civil justice landscape and
make the critical and often-overlooked point that state courts are pro se
courts; the majority of civil matters in the United States now involve at
least one unrepresented party. We then review what we know about
how courts and judges are responding to this new pro se reality. In Part
II, we ask why so little research focuses on state civil courts and
judges, particularly at a time when empirical analysis is a regular part
of legal scholarship and access to justice research is on the rise. We
identify and discuss barriers to knowledge and access; a federal court
23.
See, e.g., Laura K. Abel, Evidence-Based Access to Justice, 13 U. PA.
J.L. & SOC. CHANGE 295, 298–99 (2009) (proposing approaches to research on lowincome individuals’ legal needs); Catherine R. Albiston & Rebecca L. Sandefur,
Expanding the Empirical Study of Access to Justice, 2013 WIS. L. REV. 101 (setting out
an expansive agenda for research on the demand for and supply of legal services);
Elizabeth Chambliss et al., Introduction: What We Know and Need to Know About the
State of "Access to Justice" Research, 67 S.C. L. REV. 193 (2016) (assessing access to
justice research); Jeffrey Selbin et al., Service Delivery, Resource Allocation, and
Access to Justice: Greiner and Pattanayak and the Research Imperative, 122 YALE L.J.
ONLINE 45, 61–64 (2012), [https://perma.cc/S89K-VJ7M] (articulating a research
agenda focused on civil legal services in the context of clinical legal education).
24.
Access to justice scholars have been calling for court and judicial reform
for decades, and evidence suggests such reform is happening. However, the focus of
this work has been on the need for reform, rather than the need to study courts and how
they are changing. See, e.g., Benjamin H. Barton, Against Civil Gideon (and for Pro
Se Court Reform), 62 FLA. L. REV. 1227, 1269–74 (2010) (proposing court reform as a
solution to the pro se crisis, including an active role for judges); Engler, And Justice for
All, supra note 17, at 2028–31 (calling for pro se court reform and active judging);
Russell G. Pearce, Redressing Inequality in the Market for Justice: Why Access to
Lawyers Will Never Solve the Problem and Why Rethinking the Role of Judges Will
Help, 73 FORDHAM L. REV. 969, 976–78 (2004) (arguing for changes in the judicial
role); Deborah L. Rhode, Whatever Happened to Access to Justice?, 42 LOY. L.A. L.
REV. 869, 899–902 (2009) (calling for pro se court reform).
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bias in legal scholarship; a lack of interdisciplinary coordination in state
court research; and a trend of lawyer-centric research. In Part III, we
offer a framework for future research on state civil courts, with an
emphasis on the judicial role. Here, we develop a four-part theory of
how state courts differ from federal courts (the default focus of most
civil justice scholarship) and identify research questions based on this
theory. Specifically, we theorize that state courts differ because the
adversary process is in decline; most state court business is still
conducted through in-person interactions; the judicial role in pro se
cases is increasingly ethically ambiguous; and written substantive and
procedural law has largely not kept pace with the evolving and dynamic
issues facing state courts. In conclusion, we call for scholars to invest
in research on state civil courts and judges and briefly describe our own
ongoing research project.
I.

WHAT WE DO KNOW ABOUT STATE CIVIL COURTS AND
JUDGES

In this Section, we explore what existing data tell us about state
civil justice systems. Here, we focus on a critical and timely issue that
influences how courts and judges perform their work: the new
unrepresented majority. The composition of state court dockets has
changed dramatically over the past three decades, most notably in a
complete reversal of representation status for the majority of parties.25
Evidence, including our previous research, suggests judges respond in
varied and potentially ad hoc ways to unrepresented parties and that
traditional adversarial process no longer guides many proceedings in
our state civil courts.26
A. New Reality of State Civil Courts
Much of what we know about state civil justice, particularly the
national, comparative picture, comes from the National Center for State
Courts (“National Center”), an organization that has worked for
25.
See LANDSCAPE OF CIVIL LITIGATION, supra note 7, at 31. Steinberg,
Demand Side, supra note 7, at 751–52.
26.
See Carpenter, supra note 12, at 661–69; Shanahan, supra note 15
(manuscript at 120–22); Lawyers, Power, and Strategic Expertise, supra note 7, at
481–83 (study examining party power, expertise, and representation in a District of
Columbia unemployment compensation court, where representation rates are similar to
national numbers, and more powerful and sophisticated parties—employers—are much
more likely to be represented than less powerful parties—claimants seeking benefits);
Steinberg, Adversary Breakdown, supra note 6, at 940–43.
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decades to organize and analyze state court data, while pushing states to
improve their data collection procedures. Notably, even the National
Center’s reports are filled with caveats about the limitations of its
datasets.27
The National Center’s data describe a United States civil justice
system that has transformed steadily and substantively in fundamental
ways over the past three decades. Twenty-five years ago, nearly every
party in state court litigation was represented.28 Today, the vast
majority of people who appear in state court have no counsel and
defendants are the party least likely to be represented.29 In seventy-six
percent of cases, at least one party lacks counsel.30 Thanks to the
National Center, we know of this widespread change in the
representation status of state court litigants, but we have little data to
understand or explain the causes and consequences.
The picture that emerges from existing data has led a number of
scholars to call our state courts “the poor people’s courts.”31 Today,
wherever individuals and corporations with legal sophistication can
bypass the civil justice system, they do.32 Thus, we are left with a state
27.
See, e.g., THE LANDSCAPE OF CIVIL LITIGATION, supra note 7, at iii. The
report states:
Differences among states concerning data definitions, data collection
priorities, and organizational structure make it extremely difficult to provide
national estimates of civil caseloads with sufficient granularity to answer the
most pressing questions of state court policymakers. Id.
28.
In National Center data from 1992, both parties were represented in
approximately 95% of the tort cases disposed of in general jurisdiction courts. See
CIVIL JUSTICE SURVEY OF STATE COURTS, 1992 (1995) [hereinafter CIVIL JUSTICE
SURVEY 1992].
29.
The National Center’s 2015 Landscape study found that while plaintiffs
were represented in 92% of matters, the representation rate for defendants was 26%,
with both parties represented in only 24% of cases. See THE LANDSCAPE OF CIVIL
LITIGATION, supra note 7, at 31. Numerous studies have found that upwards of 80%–
90% of all litigants in family law cases lack counsel. See Steinberg, Demand Side,
supra note 7, at 751.
30.
See THE LANDSCAPE OF CIVIL LITIGATION, supra note 7, at iv.
31.
See, e.g., Russell Engler, Out of Sight and Out of Line: The Need for
Regulation of Lawyers' Negotiations with Unrepresented Poor Persons, 85 CALIF. L.
REV. 79, 83 (1997); see also Elizabeth L. MacDowell, Reimagining Access to Justice
in the Poor People's Courts, 22 GEO. J. POVERTY L. & POL’Y 473, 475 (2015);
Steinberg, Demand Side, supra note 7, at 746.
32.
See THE LANDSCAPE OF CIVIL LITIGATION, supra note 7, at v; Deborah R.
Hensler, Our Courts, Ourselves: How the Alternative Dispute Resolution Movement is
Re-shaping Our Legal System, 108 PA. ST. L. REV. 165, 181–84 (2003); Katherine
V.W. Stone, Procedure, Substance, and Power: Collective Litigation and Arbitration
Under the Labor Law, 61 UCLA L. REV. DISCOURSE 164, 166–67 (2013); Jessica
Silver-Greenberg & Robert Gebeloff, Arbitration Everywhere, Stacking the Decks of
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civil justice caseload primarily concerned with relatively low-value (in
monetary terms) contract and family law disputes.33 In both case types,
lack of representation is the norm, with an important exception:
plaintiffs in contract disputes.34
In family law cases, such as those involving domestic violence,
divorce, child support, child custody, and paternity, numerous studies
show pro se rates as high as eighty to ninety percent of all litigants.35
Outside of family law, the bulk of state court work now involves
represented plaintiffs (often corporations) suing unrepresented
defendants (typically low-income) in debt collection, landlord/tenant,
foreclosure, and small claims matters.36 Seventy-four percent of
defendants in these cases lack representation, while plaintiffs are almost
always represented.37
Our modern civil justice system was not designed—outside of the
small claims context—for lay people. It was designed by and for
lawyers, with a baseline assumption of party control over litigation.
Unsurprisingly, substantial evidence suggests unrepresented lay people
fare poorly when they attempt to navigate this system on their own.38
Justice,
N.Y.
TIMES
(Oct.
31,
2015),
https://www.nytimes.com/2015/11/01/business/dealbook/arbitration-everywherestacking-the-deck-of-justice.html.
33.
See THE LANDSCAPE OF CIVIL LITIGATION, supra note 7. This study is
based on a sample of ten urban courts and these courts’ non-family civil caseloads, for
a total of 925,344 cases or 5% of the national number of civil filings. Id. at iii. The
dataset is not a nationally representative sample, and for many reasons the National
Center discusses in the report, the quality of the data is not ideal. However, the
Landscape report still offers the strongest existing comparative picture of our state civil
courts. On the non-family civil side, at least one party lacks counsel, most often the
defendant, in 76% of cases. Id. at iv. Three quarters of all judgments in non-family
civil cases involved less than $5,200. Id. at iv, 35. As the National Center found, the
cost of litigating such cases with representation would, for most litigants, exceed the
monetary value of the case. Id. at iv. As the National Center notes, though big tort and
commercial contract cases are the focus of many current debates about the civil justice
system, these are only a tiny portion of the overall dataset. Only 6% of the cases were
tort matters and 2% involved real property disputes. Id. at 8. Just .2% of the cases
involved judgments exceeding $500,000 and less than .1% of cases had judgements
over $1 million. Id. at 24. Contract cases dominate civil caseloads, at 61%. Id. at 8.
34.
See id. at 31–33; CIVIL JUSTICE SURVEY 1992, supra note 28.
35.
See Steinberg, Demand Side, supra note 7, at 751.
36.
See THE LANDSCAPE OF CIVIL LITIGATION, supra note 7, at 31–33.
37.
Id. at 32.
38.
A significant body of literature explores how lay people fare when
navigating the civil justice system. See Rebecca L. Sandefur, Elements of Professional
Expertise: Understanding Relational and Substantive Expertise through Lawyers’
Impact, 80 AM. SOC. REV. 909 (2015) [hereinafter Sandefur, Elements] (meta-analysis
of existing studies on the impact of representation in civil matters). We have previously
discussed research on the experiences of pro se litigants and have conducted original
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At the outset, lay people may lose a case simply because they do not
understand the need to show up. If they do make it to the courthouse,
they struggle with basic procedures and paperwork and may never
make it to the hearing room.39 They lose meritorious cases due to
procedural challenges or because they misunderstand substantive law.
Some courts have self-help centers or other access to justice
interventions outside the courtroom, but many do not. Though we lack
a full, nationally representative picture, it is safe to say that many, if
not most, unrepresented parties have no access to legal information or
assistance before they set foot in a courtroom.
In previous articles, we have discussed the dynamics of pro se
litigation in depth and reported the results of our empirical research.40
The picture is grim. The human, social, and economic cost of the pro
se crisis in our state courts is hard to overstate. Tenants facing eviction
routinely appear in court with no knowledge of the defenses available to
them.41 Mothers and fathers engage in custody and child support
disputes with no appreciation of the legal issues at play.42 Victims of
domestic violence may fail to obtain necessary protection.43 Lowincome workers facing debt collection suits never file answers or show
up to court.44

empirical research in this area. See Lawyers, Power, and Strategic Expertise, supra
note 7, at 481–82, 508–12; Steinberg, Adversary Breakdown, supra note 6, at 925;
Jessica K. Steinberg, In Pursuit of Justice? Case Outcomes and the Delivery of
Unbundled Legal Services, 18 GEO. J. POVERTY L. & POL’Y 453, 456–58 (2011)
[hereinafter Steinberg, In Pursuit of Justice?].
39.
Shanahan, Keys to the Kingdom, supra note 15.
40.
See Carpenter, Active Judging, supra note 12; Carpenter, Mark &
Shanahan, Trial and Error, supra note 16; Colleen F. Shanahan, Anna E. Carpenter &
Alyx Mark, Can a Little Representation be a Dangerous Thing?, 67 HASTINGS L.J.
1367 (2016) [hereinafter Shanahan, Carpenter & Mark, A Dangerous Thing?] (arguing
that legal services short of full lawyer representation, such as services provided by
nonlawyer advocates, may result in less law reform activity and proposing solutions);
Shanahan, Keys to the Kingdom, supra note 15; Lawyers, Power, and Strategic
Expertise, supra note 7; Steinberg, Adversary Breakdown, supra note 6; Steinberg,
Demand Side, supra note 7; Steinberg, In Pursuit of Justice?, supra note 38.
41.
Barbara Bezdek, Silence in the Court: Participation and Subordination of
Poor Tenants' Voices in Legal Process, 20 HOFSTRA L. REV. 533, 535 (1992).
42.
See Rebecca Aviel, Why Civil Gideon Won’t Fix Family Law, 122 YALE
L.J. 2106, 2108–12 (2013); Tonya L. Brito et al., What We Know and Need to Know
About Civil Gideon, 67 S.C. L. REV. 223 (2016).
43.
See Beverly Balos, Domestic Violence Matters: The Case for Appointed
Counsel in Protective Order Proceedings, 15 TEMP. POL. & CIV. RTS. L. REV. 557,
567–68 (2006).
44.
See HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, RUBBER STAMP JUSTICE: US COURTS, DEBT
BUYING CORPORATIONS, AND THE POOR 33–34 (2016), [https://perma.cc/V8RB-YPQT];

CARPENTER – CAMERA READY (DO NOT DELETE)

2018:249

4/9/2018 10:36 AM

Studying the “New” Civil Judges

261

For a person without counsel in state court, even an act as
fundamental and common as serving process on the other party can be
an insurmountable barrier.45 In these situations, a judge may be the sole
civil court actor available to provide assistance, as in the example that
follows:
In one hearing . . . in a local domestic violence court, a
petitioner had returned to court eighteen times without
successfully completing service of process. The judge
continued to hear her case in open court, but would not direct
her on the procedure for pursuing an alternative form of
service. A judge’s refusal to assist is, therefore, not costneutral, as the same parties may return to court again and
again in pursuit of the same relief.46
Service of process in state courts may seem a prosaic topic,
particularly when compared to complex doctrinal matters in federal
appellate cases, but the implications are no less grave, particularly
when multiplied by the millions of unrepresented parties who appear in
state court each year. In the next Section, we discuss how state courts
and judges are responding to the demands of increased pro se litigation.
B. How Judges are Responding in the Courtroom
As we have shown, though we know lower courts and judges have
changed in the face of the new pro se composition of civil dockets, we
are far from a comprehensive comparative or longitudinal picture of
this new reality. We can, however, piece together the findings of oftendisconnected research efforts to observe trends, perhaps most notably a
fundamental change in the role of the civil judge.
For decades, and in the face of rising rates of pro se litigation,
scholars have assumed that the norms of party control and judicial
passivity still reign in the majority of our nation’s courtrooms. An
exception is the active management of pre-trial matters by judges in
complex litigation, a phenomenon that has been the subject of
substantial scholarly attention.47 But outside of the complex litigation
Rebecca L. Sandefur, The Fulcrum Point of Equal Access to Justice: Legal and
Nonlegal Institutions of Remedy, 42 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 949, 953–54 (2009).
45.
See Andrew Budzinski, Reforming Service of Process: An Access-toJustice Approach 2 (unpublished manuscript) (on file with authors).
46.
See Steinberg, Adversary Breakdown, supra note 6, at 954 n.236.
47.
See generally Abram Chayes, The Role of the Judge in Public Law
Litigation, 89 HARV. L. REV. 1281 (1976) (describing the rise of public law litigation in
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context, the scholarly consensus to date has been that our system
“generally lives up to [the] adversarial ideal.”48 The vast majority of
legal scholarship on the civil justice system rests on this premise.
We have accepted that premise without really taking a hard look,
and today meaningful evidence questions the conventional wisdom
about how our civil justice system operates. We have good reason to
believe that the norms and processes of the adversary system have
broken down in our state civil courts and that the role of the civil court
judge is shifting away from traditional passivity and toward active
engagement.49 The notion of judges as passive umpires calling balls and
strikes, and the related norm of party control over litigation, may no
longer accurately describe much state civil court litigation.
The growth and prevalence of pro se litigation has put tremendous
pressure on judges to assist, guide, and support those without counsel.50
Despite the continued development of self-help, limited scope legal
assistance, and other access to justice interventions (and the tireless
work of many judges, clerks, court administrators, and legal services
providers who develop these programs), the need for legal information
and advice far exceeds available resources.51 In the courtroom, judges
are often the only source of legal information for confused, frustrated
pro se litigants.52
State civil court judges face the pressure of unrepresented parties
on their dockets every day.53 Given this, it is unsurprising that many of
these judges have written and spoken extensively about the challenge of
judging in pro se matters. Typically, judges have argued that the justice
system is failing unrepresented parties and called for various types of
reform, such as judicial training, increased funding for legal services,
the federal courts and the role of judges in this context); Judith Resnik, Managerial
Judges, 96 HARV. L. REV. 374 (1982) (arguing against the rise of managerial judging).
48.
Steinberg, Adversary Breakdown, supra note 6, at 916 (quoting Brianne J.
Gorod, The Adversarial Myth: Appellate Court Extra-Record Factfinding, 61 DUKE L.J.
1, 3 (2011)). Steinberg makes the point that scholars have widely assumed the
adversarial ideal is alive and well in state civil courts.
49.
For discussions of what we know about state civil justice and judges in
particular, see Carpenter, supra note 12; Steinberg, Adversary Breakdown, supra note
6; Steinberg, Demand Side, supra note 7.
50.
See Albrecht et al., supra note 17, at 16, 43, 45–48 (recommending
specific active judging practices in response to the increase in pro se litigants).
51.
See Steinberg, Demand Side, supra note 7, at 748–52.
52.
See Carpenter, Active Judging, supra note 12, at 662; Engler, And Justice
for All, supra note 17, at 2011–16; Steinberg, Adversary Breakdown, supra note 6, at
938.
53.
See LINDA KLEIN, ABA COAL. FOR JUSTICE, REPORT ON THE SURVEY OF
JUDGES ON THE IMPACT OF THE ECONOMIC DOWNTURN ON REPRESENTATION IN THE
COURTS 10–15 (2010), [https://perma.cc/6AV9-9QD8].
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self-help programs, and a civil right to counsel.54 State court judges are
also leaders in the movement to develop statewide access to justice
commissions, typically created and supported by state supreme courts,
which are charged with finding solutions to the pro se litigation crisis.55
Finally, judges, courts, advocates, and scholars have called for new
approaches to judging and developed a significant body of trainings,
guides, curricula, and other materials to inform and educate court staff
and judges.56
54.
For just a few examples from around the country in recent years, see,
e.g., Shirley S. Abrahamson, Access to Justice: The Wisconsin Way, JUDGES’ J., Fall
2008, at 36, 36 (“The very integrity of our justice system is compromised when legal
representation for critical needs is available only to those with financial means.”);
Karen S. Adam & Stacey N. Brady, Fifty Years of Judging in Family Law: The
Cleavers have left the Building, 51 FAM. CT. REV. 28, 29 (2013) (“Most judges agree
that the shift to self-represented litigants has posed an enormous challenge for the
judicial system.”); John T. Broderick, Jr., The Choice is Ours: Remarks to the 2008
Equal Justice Conference, JUDGES’ J., Fall 2008, at 5, 7 (“It is my firm belief that the
public will not long entrust its confidence to a system of justice it often cannot navigate,
afford, or understand.”); Peter D. Houk & Donald L. Resig, Facing the Challenge of
Unrepresented Parties: Pro Se Assistance Relies on Bench-Bar Cooperation, 78 MICH.
B.J. 1126 (1999) (“[T]he influx of pro se representation often poses challenges to the
judiciary, . . . many of the judges currently assigned to the family court had little prior
experience with divorce procedures, forms, and the problems encountered by the lay
people representing themselves.”); Judith L. Kreeger, To Bundle or Unbundle? That is
the Question, 40 FAM. CT. REV. 87, 87 (2002) (“We judges wrestle daily with the
dilemma of our role in the process: where to strike the delicate balance between holding
represented and self-represented litigants to the same rules, yet, at the same time,
equalizing the playing field so that the process is fair.”); Scott W. Skavdahl, Access to
Justice: A Judge’s Perspective, WYO. LAW., Feb. 2009, at 1 (“What is wrong with this
increasing trend of pro se litigants? Justice is being lost along with respect for our legal
system and the value of legal counsel.”); Ron Spears, An Adversary System Without
Advocates, 101 ILL. B.J. 592, 592–93 (2013) (“[J]udges are uncomfortable assuming
activist and inquisitorial roles. The judge in a pro se case walks the dangerous tightrope
of providing guidance to the parties without becoming an advocate and losing
impartiality.”); Nathan “Tod” Young, The Bench, the Bar and the Unrepresented: One
Judge’s View, NEV. Law., Sept. 2014, at 11, 13 (“The litigants don't know what
evidence they need, how to present that evidence or how to test the other side's case.
They almost never possess a clear understanding of the burdens of proof or the
standards by which a court makes its decision”).
55.
For more on state access to justice commissions, see Access to Justice
Commissions, AM. B. ASS’N, [https://perma.cc/RM68-CU8Z]; Access to Justice
Commissions, CTR. ON CT. ACCESS TO JUST. FOR ALL, [https://perma.cc/M2Z6YRWY].
56.
For a small sampling of materials, see, e.g., JONA GOLDSCHMIDT ET AL.,
AM. JUDICATURE SOC’Y, MEETING THE CHALLENGE OF PRO SE LITIGATION: A REPORT
AND GUIDEBOOK FOR JUDGES AND COURT MANAGERS (1998); SELF-REPRESENTED LITIG.
NETWORK, HANDLING CASES INVOLVING SELF-REPRESENTED LITIGANTS: A NATIONAL
BENCH GUIDE FOR JUDGES (2008), [https://perma.cc/T4RS-KM8D]; THE COURT PERS.
WORKING GRP. OF THE SUPREME JUDICIAL COURT STERRING COMM’N ON SELF-
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Research, including our own, supports the idea that active judging
in state courts is far more widespread than legal scholars have
previously acknowledged and also suggests practices may vary widely
across judges, even within the same court.57 As a baseline matter,
studies have found differences in how judges apply substantive and
procedural law, with some judges refusing to follow existing law at
all.58 Our own research has shown that some judges routinely depart
from adversary procedures when dealing with pro se litigants, while
others hew to the passive norm.59
We have studied judicial behavior in pro se matters in general
jurisdiction civil courts,60 administrative courts,61 and problem-solving
courts.62 In each of these settings, we found judges who were silent,
passive umpires and judges who took an active, interventionist role in
REPRESENTED LITIGANTS, SERVING THE SELF-REPRESENTED LITIGANT: A GUIDE BY AND
MASSACHUSETTS COURT STAFF (2010), [https://perma.cc/99WZ-EBYG]; Best
Practices in Handling Cases with Self-Represented Litigants, NAT’L JUD. C. (2015),
[https://perma.cc/2SLN-PG2M] (judicial training course); Richard Zorza, Curricula:
Access to Justice for the Self-Represented, SELF-REPRESENTED LITIG. NETWORK (2013),
[https://perma.cc/YV3E-S5DQ] (a collection of learning modules for judges); Dorothy
J. Wilson & Miriam B. Hutchins, Practical Advice from the Trenches: Best Techniques
for Handling Unrepresented Litigants, 51 CT. REV. 54 (2015) (article by judges
outlining approaches to pro se litigation).
57.
See generally Bezdek, supra note 41; Carpenter, Active Judging, supra
note 12; John M. Conley & William M. O’Barr, Fundamentals of Jurisprudence: An
Ethnography of Judicial Decision Making in Informal Courts, 66 N.C. L. REV. 467
(1988) (studying judges in an informal court and finding variation in how they behave
and decide cases); Michele Cotton, A Case Study on Access to Justice and How to
Improve It, 16 J.L. & SOC’Y 61, 88 (2014) (in a case study of housing dispute, the
author found that the behavior of two judges in two separate hearings during the same
dispute differed markedly); Vicki Lens et al., Choreographing Justice: Administrative
Law Judges and the Management of Welfare Disputes, 40 J.L. & SOC’Y 199, 200 (2013)
(observing two dominant judging styles in administrative law judges, “bureaucratic”
and “adjudicatory,” and analyzing how each style affects litigants); Steinberg,
Adversary Breakdown, supra note 6.
58.
Bezdek, supra note 41, at 571 (noting how judges in a Baltimore housing
court failed to follow laws designed to protect tenants); Conley & O’Barr, supra note
57, at 468 (“[J]udges vary so much . . . that it becomes difficult to appreciate that they
are operating within the same legal system . . . .”); Cotton, supra note 3, at 67
(detailing how various judges within the Maryland District Court failed to enforce
landlord-tenant law). See also Shanahan, Keys to the Kingdom, supra note 15.
59.
See Carpenter, Active Judging, supra note 12; Steinberg, Adversary
Breakdown, supra note 6.
60.
See Steinberg, Adversary Breakdown, supra note 6.
61.
See Carpenter, Active Judging, supra note 12; Shanahan, Keys to the
Kingdom, supra note 15.
62.
See Jessica K. Steinberg, Informal, Inquisitorial, and Accurate: An
Empirical Look at a Problem-Solving Housing Court, 42 L. & SOC. INQUIRY 1058
(2017) [hereinafter Steinberg, Informal].
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assisting pro se litigants. This research tells us judges vary in how they
deal with unrepresented parties, but we need much more work to
understand the prevalence and nature of passive and active judging in
state courts.
C. How Courts are Responding
In addition to changes in judicial behavior in the courtroom, court
operations are changing in fundamental ways inside and outside the
courtroom. Though we lack a strong national picture, we know that
some courts are responding to the pro se crisis by developing
interventions meant to help unrepresented parties navigate civil
litigation. These interventions include pro se court forms,63 self-help
centers,64 court navigator programs,65 and limited scope lawyer
assistance.66 Outside of the courthouse, some states are developing
licensing programs that allow lay people to give limited forms of legal
assistance.67 Given the judiciary’s role in managing courts, judges have
initiated and led many of these programs, yet we lack understanding of
how common and effective such interventions are, let alone the forms
they take and judges’ motivations for developing them.
II.

WHY WE KNOW SO LITTLE ABOUT STATE CIVIL COURTS
AND JUDGES

How did we get to this point? How is it possible that we lack basic
information about the courts and judges that handle the vast majority of
63.
See Engler, And Justice for All, supra note 17, at 2000.
64.
See Rachel Ekery, Court Facilitation of Self-Representation, in BEYOND
ELITE LAW: ACCESS TO CIVIL JUSTICE IN AMERICA 413 (Sam Estreicher & J. Radice
eds., 2016).
65.
See Editorial, Bold Plans for New York Courts, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 20,
2015),
https://www.nytimes.com/2015/02/21/opinion/bold-plans-for-new-yorkcourts.html.
66.
Alicia M. Farley, An Important Piece of the Bundle: How Limited
Appearances Can Provide an Ethically Sound Way to Increase Access to Justice for Pro
Se Litigants, 20 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 563 (2007); Louis S. Rulli, Roadblocks to
Access to Justice: Reforming Ethical Rules to Meet the Special Needs of Low-Income
Clients, 17 U. PA. J.L. & SOC. CHANGE 347, 360 (2014).
67.
For a discussion of Washington State’s groundbreaking program that
licenses nonlawyers to provide limited scope legal services, including the judicial role
in developing the program, see Brooks Holland, The Washington State Limited License
Legal Technician Practice Rule: A National First in Access to Justice, 82 MISS. L.J.
SUPRA 75, 77 (2013), [https://perma.cc/7G4M-WJST]. See also Robert Ambrogi,
Washington State Moves Around UPL, Using Legal Technicians to Help Close the
Justice Gap, A.B.A. J. (Jan. 2015), [https://perma.cc/SGU3-S3NR].
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American civil litigation? Why the dearth of scholarship on state courts
in a time of legal empiricism?68 A number of forces at work in
government and the academy have led to the current state of affairs.69
In this Section, we describe four major impediments to research on
state civil courts and judges: knowledge and access barriers; the federal
court bias in legal scholarship; a lack of interdisciplinary coordination;
and the tendency toward lawyer-centric research.
A. Knowledge and Access Barriers
For scholars, the practical barriers to studying state courts are real
and substantial, but, we argue, not insurmountable. Unlike the federal
courts, where data can be downloaded with a few mouse clicks,
information from state civil court dockets remains much less accessible,
and in some cases inaccessible, to researchers. Even the most basic
information about state courts is generally difficult to obtain, if it exists
at all, as state court data collection is diffuse and inconsistent.70 States
have different case management and data collection systems, many of
which are relatively unsophisticated and were created merely to track
cases’ progress through the court, record filings and events, and
schedule hearings. Such systems rarely capture other case-specific or
substantive information.71
The data infrastructure that exists in the United States for other
major social institutions like education or healthcare does not exist for
state courts. This lack of quality data is connected to court funding
mechanisms.72 Unlike schools or healthcare facilities, where funding is
tied to meeting federal reporting requirements, state courts are funded
and managed primarily by state and local governments. Absent national
standards or reporting requirements, data about state courts are
collected and managed at the state and county level and shaped by local

68.
See David Freeman Engstrom, The Twiqbal Puzzle and Empirical Study of
Civil Procedure, 65 STAN. L. REV. 1203, 1204 (2013) (Noting the flurry of data-driven
scholarship in response to the Twiqbal decisions, Engstrom says, “it sometimes seems
as if a hundred empirical flowers have bloomed”).
69.
For an in-depth discussion, see Yeazell, supra note 1.
70.
“Differences among states concerning data definitions, data collection
priorities, and organizational structures make it extremely difficult to provide national
estimates of civil caseloads with sufficient granularity to answer the most pressing
questions of state court policymakers.” See THE LANDSCAPE OF CIVIL LITIGATION,
supra note 7, at iii. See also Leib, supra note 3, at 907–08; Yeazell, supra note 1.
71.
See THE LANDSCAPE OF CIVIL LITIGATION, supra note 7, at 7–8.
72.
See Yeazell, supra note 1, at 137.
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concerns and idiosyncrasies.73 In some states, different counties collect
data in different ways, making even intra-state comparisons difficult.74
And this is to say nothing about data beyond dockets and
decisions. A meaningful amount of state court business takes place in
face-to-face human interactions, which are obviously labor-intensive to
systematically capture. State court matters do not lend themselves to the
traditional methods of analysis used in federal courts. For example, a
common method of studying the federal courts, reading final decisions,
is generally either logistically impossible or not substantively useful in
the majority of state civil litigation. Many state cases do not result in
written final orders with findings of law and fact, and where such
written orders do exist, they may not be available electronically.
We must study much more than final orders and decisions if we
are interested in judicial behavior and court processes at the state level.
For example, the National Center estimates that somewhere between
twenty and forty-six percent of cases end in default judgment.75 The
real number is impossible to ascertain with existing data given that
courts do not consistently record the nature of a final judgment.76 But
whether the default number is on the high or low end of that estimate,
we clearly need to know more about the role of courts—and judges—in
helping or hindering defendants’ appearance rates, a question of more
limited importance in the federal court context given that most parties
have representation.
The upshot of these dynamics is that the study of state civil courts
is logistically challenging and often requires original data collection and
coding efforts, including hand-collection of data from case files, inperson field research, and live interviews.77 Of course, this presents an
incredible opportunity for scholars to forge new ground by taking up
the work of data-gathering and analysis in state courts. The study of
state civil courts also allows researchers to ask different types of

73.
Id.
74.
Id. at 136.
75.
THE LANDSCAPE OF CIVIL LITIGATION, supra note 7, at iv, 20. In the
National Center data, courts recorded 46% percent of cases as ending in a final
judgment. The researchers speculate that most of these are likely default judgments. As
the researchers explain, 20% of cases were explicitly recorded as ending in default
judgments. However, another 26% of cases were recorded as having a judgment
entered, but without specifying the nature of the disposition. A significant number of
this latter 26% may be defaults.
76.
Id.
77.
See Carpenter, Active Judging, supra note 12, at 651–52; Leib, supra note
4, 898–99.
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questions and to focus on aspects of judging and court operation that
extend beyond the limited scope of voting patterns and decisions.
B. Federal Court Bias in Legal Scholarship
When legal scholars speak about the civil justice system, they most
often speak about the federal system and appellate courts, whether they
note this explicitly or not.78 Legal scholars have examined the work of
lower civil court judges in only a relatively minuscule number of
published studies.79 Though we are decades into the empirical
revolution in legal scholarship, state courts and judges have been left
out of the explosion of empirical activity, but scholars rarely
acknowledge this absence.80 It seems likely that practical considerations
play a large role in the legal academy’s focus on federal and appellate
courts. It cannot be true that the dearth of scholarship on state civil
courts reflects a principled choice.
A review of existing work reveals not only a focus on appellate
courts, but on a small slice of appellate court work: published
decisions.81 When legal scholars do write about state courts, they focus
primarily on criminal law and litigation.82 Assuming the dearth of
scholarship on state civil courts is not based in principle, there is at
least one obvious explanation for it: people tend to write about what
they know and most legal scholars simply have little to no experience
with lower level civil courts. Most law faculty start their careers as elite
78.
See supra notes 3 & 5 and accompanying text.
79.
See, e.g., Paris R. Baldacci, Assuring Access to Justice: The Role of the
Judge in Assisting Pro Se Litigants in Litigating Their Cases in New York City’s
Housing Court, 3 CARDOZO PUB. L. POL’Y & ETHICS J. 659 (2006); Bezdek, supra note
41, at 540; Carpenter, Active Judging, supra note 12; Lee Harris, Judging Tenant
Protections: The Evidence from Enforcement of Landlord Penalties, 42 U. MEM. L.
REV. 149 (2011); Shanahan, Keys to the Kingdom, supra note 15; Steinberg, Informal,
supra note 62.
80.
On the growth of legal empiricism, see Engstrom, supra note 68, at 1204–
05.
81.
See supra note 3 and accompanying text. See also Linos & Carlson, supra
note 19.
82.
See, e.g., Michael G. Collins & Jonathan Remy Nash, Prosecuting
Federal Crimes in State Courts, 97 VA. L. REV. 243 (2011); Wayne A. Logan,
“Democratic Despotism” and Constitutional Constraint: An Empirical Analysis of Ex
Post Facto Claims in State Courts, 12 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 439 (2003); Neil
Colman McCabe, State Constitutions and Substantive Criminal Law, 71 TEMP. L. REV.
521 (1998); Allegra M. McLeod, Decarceration Courts: Possibilities and Perils of a
Shifting Criminal Law, 100 GEO. L.J. 1587 (2012); Jenny Roberts, Why Misdemeanors
Matter: Defining Effective Advocacy in the Lower Criminal Courts, 45 U.C. DAVIS L.
REV. 277 (2012).
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law firm associates or federal court clerks.83 Even those faculty who
have practiced in state courts have likely practiced criminal, rather than
civil, law.
In addition, legal scholarship on judges draws heavily on theory
and tools from political science and judicial decision making is the main
focus of this literature. Here, decision making is almost always
analyzed through the lens of appellate, mostly federal, decisions, with a
major focus on the U.S. Supreme Court. Indeed, a review of the
research suggests the study of judges and judicial behavior is
synonymous with understanding how appellate judges interpret and
apply the law.84 Judges’ votes and written decisions are the main units
of observation in the bulk of studies, with a major focus on published
decisions.85 The research typically attempts to identify and understand
the factors, including and in addition to the law, that might explain how
and why judges make decisions.86
C. Lack of Interdisciplinary Coordination
In the face of legal scholarship’s focus on federal courts, much of
what the academy has to say about state courts and judges comes from
fields outside of law, including the work of political science,87

83.
See Richard E. Redding, “Where Did You Go to Law School?”
Gatekeeping for the Professoriate and Its Implications for Legal Education, 53 J.L.
EDUC. 594, 601 (2003) (Finding that of the 86.6% of professors who had some type of
previous practice experience, 57% had a judicial clerkship and 44.7% had worked in
firms or as corporate counsel).
84.
See, e.g., Lawrence Baum, Motivation and Judicial Behavior: Expanding
the Scope of Inquiry, in THE PSYCHOLOGY OF JUDICIAL DECISIONMAKING 3, 4 (David
Klein & Gregory Mitchell eds., 2010).
85.
Exceptions include, for example, studies that examine broader political
and institutional dynamics, such as how judges perceive and respond to threats to
judicial independence and power. See, e.g., Alyx Mark & Michael Zilis, Blurring
Institutional Boundaries: Judges’ Perceptions of Threats to Judicial Independence, J.L.
& CTS. (forthcoming).
86.
See, e.g., Brian H. Bix, Doctrine, Data, and High Theory, 6 U.C. IRVINE
L. REV. 137, 142–43 (2016); Michael J. Gerhardt, Attitudes about Attitudes, 101 MICH.
L. REV. 1733 (2003).
87.
See, e.g., Christina L. Boyd, Representation on the Courts? The Effects of
Trial Judges’ Sex and Race, 69 POL. RES. Q. 788 (2016) (study of judicial diversity and
its effect on trial court decision making); Victor E. Flango & David B. Rottman,
Research Note: Measuring Trial Court Consolidation, 16 JUST. SYS. J. 65 (1992)
(review of research on changes to court structure); Michael J. Nelson, Uncontested and
Unaccountable? Rates of Contestation in Trial Court Elections, 94 JUDICATURE 208
(2011) (study of state trial court election contestation rates). For an overview of
political science research on state supreme courts, see, e.g., Chris W. Bonneau & Brent
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anthropology,88 sociology,89 social work,90 and psychology.91 But even
this work tends to focus on state criminal, as opposed to civil,
dockets.92 In addition, there is a significant body of socio-legal
scholarship on lower-level courts and judges outside of the United
States.93 However, it is rare to see American legal scholars cite this
work.
The nature of and need for interdisciplinary coordination in the
study of law and legal systems is sufficient fodder for a much more inD. Boyea, State Courts, Past Present, and Future, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF
STATE AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT 343 (Donald P. Haider-Markel ed., 2014).
88.
See Conley & O’Barr, supra note 57, at 481–82 (identifying five judicial
typologies—the strict adherent, the lawmaker, the mediator, the authoritarian, and the
proceduralist).
89.
See JAMES PTACEK, BATTERED WOMEN IN THE COURTROOM: THE POWER
OF JUDICIAL RESPONSES 174 (1999) (setting out a typology of judges in domestic
violence cases); Eisenberg, supra note 3.
90.
Vicki Lens, Confronting Government After Welfare Reform: Moralists,
Reformers, and Narratives of (Ir)responsibility at Administrative Fair Hearings, 43 J.L.
& SOC’Y 563 (2009); Vicki Lens et al., Choreographing Justice: Administrative Law
Judges and the Management of Welfare Disputes, 40 J.L. & SOC’Y 199 (2013).
91.
See, e.g., THE PSYCHOLOGY OF JUDICIAL DECISIONMAKING, supra note 84,
at xi, 5; Peter David Blanck, Calibrating the Scales of Justice: Studying Judges'
Behavior in Bench Trials, 68 IND. L.J. 1119 (1993) (study of the effect of extra-legal
judicial behaviors on trial outcome); Gillian M. Pinchevsky, Understanding DecisionMaking in Specialized Domestic Violence Courts: Can Contemporary Theoretical
Frameworks Help Guide These Decisions?, 23 VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN 749, 751,
755 (2017) (discussing how judges develop "pattern responses" to cases with
stereotypical attributions); Tom R. Tyler, What is Procedural Justice?: Criteria Used
by Citizens to Assess the Fairness of Legal Procedures, 22 L. & SOC’Y REV. 103 (1988)
(seminal study examining procedural justice).
92.
For examples of social science work on criminal and problem solving
courts, see Blanck, supra note 91; Ursula Castellano, The Politics of Benchcraft: The
Role of Judges in Mental Health Courts, 42 L. & SOC. INQUIRY 398 (2017); Marc
Galanter et al., The Crusading Judge: Judicial Activism in Trial Courts, 52 S. CAL. L.
REV. 699 (1979); Maureen Mileski, Courtroom Encounters: An Observation Study of a
Lower Criminal Court, 5 L. & SOC’Y REV. 473, 473, 475, 523 (1971) (early study of
lower courts that presents typology of judicial demeanor); Suzanna Fay Ramirez,
Therapeutic Jurisprudence in Practice: Changes in Family Treatment Court Norms over
Time, 40 L. & SOC. INQUIRY 205 (2015).
93.
See, e.g., Jeanne Hersant & Cécile Vigour, Judicial Politics on the
Ground, 42 L. & SOC. INQUIRY 292 (2017) (introducing a symposium featuring bottomup approaches to studying judicial politics, as compared to traditional top-down
approaches); Kathy Mack & Sharyn Roach Anleu, ‘Getting Through the List’:
Judgecraft and Legitimacy in the Lower Courts, 16 SOC. & LEGAL STUDS. 341 (2007)
(study of Australian lower court judges); Richard Young, Managing the List in the
Lower Criminal Courts: Judgecraft or Crafty Judges, 41 COMMON L. WORLD REV. 29,
30 (2012) (study examining judicial behavior through a lens of “craftiness,” arguing
that past studies of “judgecraft” have failed to capture the moral implications of docket
management practices).
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depth treatment than we can give it here. The key point we want to
make is this: in the study of state civil courts, as in other areas of
research on law and legal systems, disciplinary differences have been a
barrier to establishing a shared body of knowledge, particularly one that
accounts for the role of legal rules and legal meaning.94 Scholars from
different fields bring their own perspectives and tools to bear on the
study of civil courts, often without considering previous work in a
similar setting but from a different field, and often applying a “purely
social science approach” to the study of judges and legal systems, and
are thus failing to account for the role of law.95 Law and society
literature includes many important studies on lower courts, both
domestically and internationally, but most existing studies do not share
theoretical frameworks, research questions, or methodological
approaches, making comparisons between studies and the development
of shared knowledge challenging.96 We hope future research will
acknowledge and wrestle with these dynamics.
D. Lawyer-Centric Research
In the access to justice field, a growing area of interdisciplinary
scholarship, we have seen surprisingly little research on judges and
courts. Access to justice research is in a boom period, with scholars,
foundations, and government making substantial investments in a range
of efforts from retrospective studies to randomized control trials. A
number of leading access to justice scholars have articulated thoughtful
research agendas to shape theory, identify critical questions, and guide
the field.97 However, the bulk of existing work (and calls for research)
has focused on legal services delivery and needs, and most research has
94.
This phenomenon extends beyond the study of state courts and judges; the
need for greater interdisciplinary integration in the study of law is a core argument of
the new legal realists. See, e.g., Michael McCann, Preface to THE NEW LEGAL
REALISM, VOLUME I: TRANSLATING LAW-AND-SOCIETY FOR TODAY’S LEGAL PRACTICE,
at xv (Elizabeth Mertz et al. eds., 2016); Bix, supra note 86, at 138; Hanoch Dagan &
Roy Kreitner, The New Legal Realism and the Realist View of Law, L. & SOC. INQUIRY
(manuscript at 5) (forthcoming); Bryant Garth & Elizabeth Mertz, Introduction: New
Legal Realism at Ten Years and Beyond, 6 U.C. IRVINE L. REV. 121, 123 (2016);
Victoria Nourse & Gregory Shaffer, Empiricism, Experimentalism, and Conditional
Theory, 67 SMU L. REV. 141, 142 (2014); Mark C. Suchman & Elizabeth
Mertz, Toward a New Legal Empiricism: Empirical Legal Studies and New Legal
Realism, 6 ANN. REV. L. & SOC. SCI. 555, 556 (2010).
95.
THE NEW LEGAL REALISM, VOLUME II: STUDYING LAW GLOBALLY 2
(Heinz Klug & Sally Engle Merry eds., 2016) [hereinafter THE NEW LEGAL REALISM].
96.
See, e.g., id. at 4 (noting that “[s]tudents of judicial behavior in law and
political science do not always make their theoretical premises explicit”).
97.
See supra note 23.
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addressed whether and how a given legal service or intervention is
effective.
The majority of access to justice scholars who have written about
courts and judges have focused on two projects: first, making the
normative case that courts and judges should change in response to the
needs of pro se parties, and second, offering prescriptions for such
reform.98 We hasten to add that access to justice scholarship is, by
definition, focused on the civil legal needs of low- and middle-income
people and their experiences within civil justice systems. As scholars
who have conducted legal services evaluation studies, we value and
encourage this research. However, as the access to justice research
agenda expands, we believe it must make room for the study of courts
and judges.
III.

A THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK FOR STUDYING STATE CIVIL
COURTS AND JUDGES

The work of state courts and judges touches on every aspect of
American civic, economic, and family life.99 These vital institutions and
people are worthy of critical and thoughtful scholarly attention, which
has been sorely lacking to date. In this Section, we call for research
focused on state courts and, in particular, on the role of judges. Such
research should take a broad view of the judicial role, encompassing the
work judges do in trials, in the courtroom more broadly, and beyond
the courtroom. It is time to expand our notions of judicial behavior,
power, and decision making beyond outdated assumptions about the
traditional adversary process. The time has come to study how judges
operate in the new pro se reality and explore the factors that influence
their choices, such as written law, informal norms, extra-judicial
pressures, and personal preferences.
To support future research, this Part offers a theoretical
framework grounded in a fundamental observation about our civil
justice system: the vast majority of parties in our state civil courts are
unrepresented. With the new pro se reality as the backdrop, this
framework identifies four key ways state civil justice systems differ
from federal systems and thus from prevailing understandings about the
nature and operation of civil justice. Based on existing research,
including our own, we posit that research on America’s civil justice
system must respond to, and wrestle with, the four factors that follow.

98.
99.

See supra note 24.
See Galanter, supra note 21; Yeazell, supra note 1.
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First, the adversary process no longer guides many proceedings in
our state civil courts. The quiet crumbling of adversary norms casts
judges, not parties, as the central actors in state civil litigation.100
Research must consider how judges respond, both inside and outside
the courtroom, to the outsized demands placed upon their time and
expertise by the pro se majority. For example, in the absence of
lawyer-driven adversarial process, research must examine the processes
that have taken its place, including how they have developed. And in
the face of new access to justice interventions, research must
contemplate how judges may be serving as architects and managers of
complex court ecosystems that outsource a portion of their role to
emerging self-help and lay advocacy programs.
Second, unlike in the federal courts, a substantial amount of state
court business is still conducted through direct judge-to-party
interactions. Most case events occur in live court, not through the
exchange of paper. These in-person interactions often have the function
and effect of hearings, but are not formally labeled as such. The
dominance of court-based adjudication in state courts challenges the
relevance of the “vanishing trial”101 descriptor, and suggests that
research on in-court interactions, case dispositions, and formal and
informal judicial decision making are necessary to understand how most
of the civil justice system actually operates.
Third, the judicial role in state courts is ethically ambiguous in pro
se cases and lacks strong guideposts.102 Traditional canons, such as the
prescription of impartiality, are difficult to reconcile with the type of
active judging that is occurring in state civil courts. Research that seeks
to chart the varying forms of active judging would be particularly
useful, as would research that considers how active judging practices
may be forging new ethical ground. How judges learn to balance
competing obligations to ethical canons and pro se litigants is also an
important area of inquiry, including whether judges are learning to
strike this balance in formal or informal ways.
Fourth, written law is relatively static in state courts, but judges
must apply the law in highly dynamic legal and factual scenarios. In the
areas of law that dominate state court dockets, such as debt collection,
landlord-tenant, and family law, few state appellate decisions contribute
to the growth of substantive law,103 and little attention is devoted to the
100. See Steinberg, Adversary Breakdown, supra note 6.
101. See Galanter, supra note 21.
102. See infra note 116 and accompanying text.
103. This is not a critique of state appellate courts. Instead, we are noting that
cases involving pro se parties are unlikely to be appealed. For more discussion on the
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development of contextually appropriate procedural rules.104 Thus, state
court judges must often make decisions in contexts where substantive
and procedural law have not kept pace with evolving conditions on the
ground, a reality that crystallizes these judges’ significance. While law
at the federal level evolves through formal rule-making and higher
court precedent, state court judges are far more reliant on off-the-books
experimentation to develop legal standards and are more responsive to
highly local needs and norms.105 The mismatch between static formal
law development in the state courts and dynamic judicial application of
law should be an important facet of future civil justice research.
Inevitably and ideally, future research will suggest refinements and
additions to the framework we present below. As we have noted
throughout this article, we simply lack sufficient empirical information
to comprehensively understand how state civil justice operates. Our
theory is based on existing research, including our own, and is a
starting point for thinking about the study of state civil courts and
judges. Below, we flesh out our claims about the four defining features
of state civil justice that should inform future research, identify the
implications, and offer research questions.
A. Disappearing Adversary Process
The statistical picture of state courts proves an undeniable, but too
often ignored, reality: state courts are pro se courts. To study state civil
judges is to study judges who primarily interact with unrepresented
parties. Old assumptions about the adversarial process and party-driven
litigation cannot shape our approach to understanding the civil justice
system writ large. These assumptions may hold true in federal court,
where most parties have representation, but the study of state courts
and judges must be grounded in new theoretical models and deploy
research questions tailored to courts with few lawyers. As the National
Center has written, “[t]he idealized picture of an adversarial system in

relationship between pro se litigation and appeals, see Annie Decker, A Theory of Local
Common Law, 35 CARDOZO L. REV. 1939, 1968–69 (2014) (discussing factors that
make appeals from lower courts unlikely); Shanahan, Carpenter & Mark, A Dangerous
Thing?, supra note 40 (discussing the importance of law reform activity, including
appeals, in state civil courts and arguing that such activity is rare where parties lack full
lawyer representation); Kathryn A. Sabbeth, Simplicity as Justice, 2018 WIS. L. REV.
305 (arguing that the cost of pursuing litigation deters pro se parties from enforcing
their rights).
104. See infra note 134 and accompanying text.
105. See Decker, supra note 103, at 1978.
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which both parties are represented by competent attorneys who can
assert all legitimate claims and defenses is an illusion.”106
Rather than assuming the adversary system is functioning as it
should, future research should ask what processes are actually in place
in state courts today. State civil judges bear the daily burden of
upholding the rule of law and fidelity to procedure while facing
courtrooms filled with unrepresented people. Only the rare case
involves lawyers on both sides. In this context, do judges apply formal
procedural rules to pro se parties? Or have they developed alternative
procedural systems? If so, how are the new rules developed? Are they
formal or informal? And do they apply only to pro se parties, or to
lawyers as well?
Research should also account for differences in party and case
type, including the balance of power and expertise on either side of a
case. In the non-family civil matters that dominate state court dockets
(debt collection, foreclosure, and landlord/tenant cases), unrepresented
defendants are likely to be low-income or at least temporarily
struggling financially. On the other side of the case, these defendants
face sophisticated parties (landlords, banks, credit card companies, and
debt holders) represented by lawyers. We should explore how judges
respond when they are a key source, if not the only source, of
information, assistance, and guidance for pro se defendants facing
repeat player lawyers. Do they adhere to formal procedures, maintain a
passive posture, or develop new procedures? How do they manage
cases where only one party is capable of engaging in meaningful factual
development and legal argument? Do they help pro se defendants
develop defenses? Right now, the questions are nearly limitless, as we
know almost nothing of how judges manage dockets with one-sided
representation. The socio-economic reality of state court dockets calls
for research that accounts for imbalances of power and resources and
examines how judges navigate these dynamics.
Family cases raise other important questions. In these cases,
litigants come to court to deal with issues including relationship
dissolution, domestic violence, and child custody—it goes without
saying that family law litigation is inherently stressful, painful, and
sometimes dangerous. Here, research suggests the majority of parties
are pro se. Thus, in most family law cases, neither party is positioned
to engage in the adversary process. There are no lawyers to file
appropriate paperwork, raise factual issues, or brief the judge on the
law. Instead, judges must find a way to move cases along and make
factual and legal determinations in matters where the human stakes are
106.

THE LANDSCAPE OF CIVIL LITIGATION, supra note 7, at vi.
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high and there are no lawyers to act as buffers. How do judges manage
cases when neither of the parties is equipped to advance their own
interests? How do they make decisions when neither party can assist
with the basic (or what is basic to lawyers) tasks of identifying relevant
factual and legal issues? What would we find if we compared judicial
behavior in debt and family law cases within the same court?
Research should also examine new access to justice interventions,
such as lay advocacy or self-help programs, and how these
interventions relate to judges’ work. For example, we suspect the pro
se crisis is prompting some judges to outsource their role to other
actors outside of or adjacent to the civil justice system. For instance, in
our research, we have observed that judges in domestic violence courts
ask lay advocates employed by nonprofit organizations to explain legal
processes and substantive legal decisions to litigants.107 Research in this
area could examine how the advent of court-based self-help and other
assistance programs shapes what judges do inside the courtroom, as
well as how judges shape such programs. A party who has received
some form of legal assistance before speaking with a judge may be
better or differently prepared for that interaction. Judges may also have
heightened expectations of parties who they know or believe to have
received some sort of assistance.
The limited available evidence strongly supports the notion that
traditional adversarialism no longer controls much litigation in state
courts, yet we have only limited data and theory to describe and
conceptualize the systems and processes that have replaced it. Without
substantially more information about the new normal in pro se courts,
we cannot begin the critical project of understanding the relationship
between this on-the-ground reality and formal law. We hope future
research will explore this ongoing transformation, the role judges play
in it, and what it means for civil justice outcomes and the rule of law
more broadly.
B. Prevalence of In-Person Interactions
A deeper consideration of the nature and day-to-day reality of state
court litigation suggests that the prevailing “vanishing trial” narrative
of federal courts does not map neatly onto the state court context.108
107. Carpenter, Steinberg, Shanahan & Mark, Research Notes (unpublished)
(on file with authors) [hereinafter Research Notes].
108. Mark Galanter first described the “vanishing trial” phenomenon in federal
and state courts, pointing out that the overall number of bench and jury trials has
declined in both contexts, supra note 21. Subsequently, Herbert Kritzer pushed back on
Galanter’s claims, pointing out the challenges in analyzing state court statistics on the
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The most recent state court data do show an overall decline in the
number of cases recorded as disposed via bench or jury trials,109 but
unlike federal courts, state court business is primarily still conducted
through live, in-person interactions, most often in public courtrooms.
Many of these interactions are decidedly trial-like in substance and
outcome, though they may not be recorded as formal trials.110
In many state court cases, parties, including the majority who
are unrepresented, routinely appear in court and interact with judges
who may, short of an evidentiary hearing, enter a default judgment or
negotiated settlement, dismiss a case based on a procedural defect, or
merely continue a matter for a later date. Beyond this, our research has
uncovered many interactions, short of formal trials, that involve
informal fact development and evidence-taking and implicate
fundamental rights.111 Given that a basic reality of pro se litigation is a
lack of quality pleadings, most fact development must take place live,
in the courtroom. At the initial hearings that commence many state
court matters, judges typically collect facts, discuss legal issues, and
may even make dispositive decisions related to case outcomes, though
formal trial protections are not triggered. Such interactions may seem
trivial or routine to lawyers, but for unrepresented people, they can be
frightening and may have life-altering consequences.112
In-person interactions are common and likely have some of the
most serious implications in the fact-intensive, short-term, emergency
litigation that many vulnerable, unrepresented people find themselves
involved in, such as landlord/tenant and domestic violence cases. Such
matters are handled on an expedited basis dictated by statute, involve
essentially no motion practice, and often do not result in final, written
number of bench or jury trials, given wide variation in how states and individual courts
define “trial.” Kritzer argues that we need more clarity about what counts as a trial and
that getting such clarity requires a clear understanding of why we care about the
number of trials in the first place. Herbert M. Kritzer, The Trials and Tribulations of
Counting “Trials,” 62 DEPAUL L. REV. 415, 429–36 (2013).
109. See THE LANDSCAPE OF CIVIL LITIGATION, supra note 7, at 37.
110. For a discussion of variations in how state courts count trials and the
implications of these variations, see Kritzer, supra note 108, at 430.
111. Research Notes, supra note 107. See also Shanahan, Keys to the Kingdom,
supra note 15 (discussing the importance of a litigant’s ability to gain access to the
hearing room); Steinberg, Informal, supra note 62 (study of a housing court where the
judge routinely considers evidence and makes informal rulings without following a
traditional adversarial process).
112. Going to court is often an experience of fear and intimidation for those
without counsel. In a recent study, the words “scary,” “confusing,” and “afraid” were
used consistently when respondents described their experiences with administrative
hearings. Sara Sternberg Greene, Race, Class, and Access to Civil Justice, 101 IOWA L.
REV. 1263, 1296 (2016).
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orders. Instead, cases are processed and resolved, and decisions are
rendered, live, in the courtroom. Research on state courts may reveal a
previously unappreciated number of substantive and consequential
interactions between judges and parties, despite the low number of
formal evidentiary hearings. If this is true, we need to understand the
nature and consequences of such interactions and the processes by
which judges engage in decision-making.
For example, settlement should be a focus of this work. As Russell
Engler has argued, given the potential for pro se parties to be confused,
coerced, or merely misinformed, the role judges play in state court
settlement talks warrants deep examination.113 In addition, we can
examine how judges might encourage or discourage parties to negotiate
in the first place, including incentives that might motivate judicial
intervention and the other court actors who might be involved in presettlement interactions.
Beyond settlement, we need to understand how judges act in other
formal aspects of litigation, including default hearings, initial and status
hearings, and cases with procedural and substantive legal defects. We
need to examine how judges in these cases apply the law and interact
with parties like plaintiffs who fail to serve process or plead relevant
facts, or defendants who are unaware of possible defenses. Such routine
and basic elements of litigation have real, substantive effects on the
people and businesses that rely on civil courts to resolve disputes.
An examination of judging in state courts can also explore the
range of quasi-formal and informal interactions judges have with parties
on a daily basis. Anyone who spends an hour sitting in a state civil
court is sure to witness a party asking a judge a substantive legal,
procedural, or logistical question outside of the time when their matter
is being formally heard. What is the nature and range of such
interactions? How and why might they bleed into dispositive issues?
More than twenty million cases are filed in state civil courts each
year.114 Most of these cases involve some form of in-person interaction
between judges and parties, but we know almost nothing about the
nature and consequences of these interactions for judges, parties, or the
administration of justice. Studying these interactions undoubtedly
requires in-person observations by scholars, or at a minimum,
interviews with judges and litigants. This requires the use of research

113. See, e.g., Russell Engler, Ethics in Transition: Unrepresented Litigants
and the Changing Judicial Role, 22 NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS & PUB. POL’Y 367, 376–
78, 385 (2008) [hereinafter Engler, Ethics in Transition].
114. See NAT’L CTR. FOR STATE COURTS, EXAMINING THE WORK OF STATE
COURTS, supra note 4, at 3.
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methods not common in legal scholarship, which creates opportunities
for interdisciplinary collaboration. Such research will inevitably offer
new and novel insights about our civil justice system, insights that
could never be revealed through an examination of electronic or paper
court records.
C. Ethically Ambiguous Judicial Role
State court judges face a massive area of ambiguity, one they are
currently forced to resolve on a daily basis: the legal and ethical bounds
of their role in pro se litigation. Some authorities have taken a
permissive stance on judicial departures from the passive norm, most
notably the Model Code of Judicial Conduct, which now states that a
judge does not violate her duty of impartiality if she makes “reasonable
accommodations” for a pro se party.115 Of course, this language is
broad, vague, and entirely open to interpretation. As a general matter,
there is little in the way of specific guidance on the scope, nature, and
objectives of a judge’s role in pro se litigation.116 To make matters
worse, many authorities have issued conflicting dictates.117
Given that lay people are not trained to manage litigation, whether
and how judges apply law and procedure in the courtroom, including
whether and how they actively depart from the norms of party control
and judicial passivity, should be a major focus of inquiry. We have
previously called such departures “active judging.”
In our past research in lower courts, we identified four categories
of behavior judges engage in that depart from the traditional norms of
passive judging and party control; (1) adjusting procedures; (2)
explaining law and process; (3) eliciting information; and (4) raising
new legal issues not previously raised by parties.118 In the course of

115. MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT R. 2.2 cmt. 4 (AM. BAR ASS’N
2007).
116. Indeed, Russell Engler and Jessica Steinberg, among others, have tackled
these ethical and legal questions. See, e.g., Albrecht et al., supra note 17, at 43–45;
Engler, And Justice for All, supra note 17, at 2043; Engler, Ethics in Transition, supra
note 113, at 370; GOLDSCHMIDT ET AL., supra note 56, at 55–57; Pearce, supra note
24, at 978; Steinberg, Adversary Breakdown, supra note 6, at 926–31.
117. For a full discussion of this issue, see Steinberg, Adversary Breakdown,
supra note 6, at 927.
118. In previous work, we have discussed these four key areas of active
judicial engagement in pro se matters. For a three-dimensional theory of active judging,
which captures a judge’s role in adjusting procedures, eliciting information, and
explaining law and process, see generally Carpenter, Active Judging, supra note 12, at
667–72. For a discussion of a judge’s role in raising new legal issues and a normative
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ongoing research in state courts, we have identified additional potential
categories of judicial activity, including: (5) referring parties to courtbased and non-profit service providers; and (6) facilitating negotiation
between parties.
In this research, we have found variation in whether and how
judges engage in active judging.119 Some judges still hew to the passive
norm, leaving parties to fend for themselves.120 Others conceptualize
their role in pro se matters as entirely active, even as a matter of
principle.121 We have interviewed judges who believe that remaining
passive is, in fact, a breach of their duties of fairness and
impartiality.122 We have found judges who routinely explain law and
process to parties, but believe that asking questions to complete the
factual record is inappropriate.123 This work suggests a wide range of
judicial behavior in the context of pro se litigation and the need for
more research.
Potential research questions on active judging include how, and
how frequently, judges adjust procedures, explain law and process,
elicit information, raise new legal issues, and refer or facilitate
negotiation when interacting with self-represented parties. Do judicial
strategies differ across judges, parties, or issues? Do these categories
adequately capture active judging across contexts? How is judicial
behavior shaped by law, procedure, or informal norms?
Pro se litigation appears to have shaped judicial behavior in other
ways that are uncommon in lawyer-dominated federal courtrooms and
ripe for exploration in state courts. For example, judges often make
blanket announcements about law, procedure, and courtroom norms at
the start of, or during, pro se dockets.124 A judge might inform the
courtroom that she will not accept certain types of evidence, or she
might explain to parties how cases are typically resolved, offering a
menu of choices such as a hearing, settlement, or continuance. We
should understand how common such statements are, what they include,
and how they relate to judicial ethics. We can examine what effect
these announcements might have on a judges’ expectations for parties in

argument that courts should have an affirmative duty to assist pro se litigants, see
generally Steinberg, Adversary Breakdown, supra note 6, at 947.
119. Carpenter, Active Judging, supra note 12; Steinberg, Adversary
Breakdown, supra note 6, at 916–17.
120. Steinberg, Adversary Breakdown, supra note 6.
121. Id. at 912; Carpenter, Active Judging, supra note 12, at 686.
122. Carpenter, Active Judging, supra note 12, at 658.
123. Id. at 672.
124. Research Notes, supra note 107.
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subsequent interactions and explore how they affect parties’ choices and
experiences.
In addition to a lack of understanding about what judges are
actually doing in their daily work, we know next to nothing of how
judges learn and understand their duties and roles in the new pro se
reality. How do judges perceive their obligations to advance access to
justice or reach merits-based decisions? How do judges gain and
exercise expertise in handling pro se cases? Are they formally trained
or do they learn informally, through peer review mechanisms?125 In
addition to written law, other contextual factors may influence how
judges behave, including training, other judges, unwritten norms, and
institutional resources. This area is almost completely unexplored by
current scholarship.
Many judges are required, or choose, to engage in some form of
training and education. How does judicial training and education shape
judicial behavior, if at all? In previous research, we found that almost
all judges in an administrative court were required to attend a training
on “Fair Hearings” at the National Judicial College.126 We know of no
scholars who have examined the content, value, and impact of such
training on judicial behavior, let alone how this training might affect
how judges manage pro se dockets and interact with unrepresented
parties.
Our research suggests judges learn from one another, whether
through formal court-run training programs and peer observations, or
through informal interactions.127 What role do other judges play in
teaching new judges how to do their job? How much influence do
judges have on one another in their day-to-day work? In some courts,
the most challenging dockets are run by unelected magistrates appointed
by elected judges. How do these magistrates view the scope of their
authority given their appointed positions? To what extent do other
judges, intentionally or unintentionally, constrain or shape their
behavior? Are there collectively accepted norms that supplement
written laws and rules?
Today, we have sufficient data to suggest, at a minimum,
meaningful variation in how state court judges understand and execute
their ethical duties in the new pro se reality, even within the same
courthouse. But we are far away from a comprehensive picture of
judicial behavior, and even further from understanding of how changes
125. For a study that examines judicial peer review in a pro se court, see
Carpenter, Active Judging, supra note 12, at 700.
126. Research Notes, supra note 107.
127. Carpenter, Active Judging, supra note 12, at 700.
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to the judicial role have affected litigants, procedural justice, or
substantive case outcomes. We hope future research will examine the
nature, prevalence, variation, and causes of judicial departures from the
passive norm. Such data can support a meaningful and necessary
normative conversation about judicial ethics, a conversation currently
stymied by a lack of information about conditions on the ground.
D. Static Written Law and Dynamic Courts
At the state level, written law is relatively static, particularly in the
areas of substantive law where most parties are pro se. In contrast, state
courts and the cases they handle are dynamic. Law develops differently
in state court than it does in federal court.128 Though we lack solid
empirics, we and others posit that at the state and local level, it is likely
that law evolves through local norms, local needs, and experimentation,
with limited reliance on the dictates of appellate courts.129 This is not to
say that appellate decisions do not matter to state court judges (though it
is possible this is true in some cases), but to point out that appellate
courts simply have not spoken on many of the legal and procedural
issues state court judges face on a daily basis.130 At least one reason for
appellate court silence is that, in areas of law primarily concerned with
the lives and fortunes of low-income people, appeals are exceedingly
rare.131
State court dockets are busy and demanding while the cases are
factually varied. Even substantively “simple” cases can involve
complex facts and raise novel legal issues. Judges regularly face
situations where substantive law does not adequately guide their
decision making, but they must decide issues and cases (often under
time-pressure) nonetheless.132 The sheer volume and range of cases
state court judges handle makes this situation inevitable, and, we
suspect research would reveal, common. Legislatures and appellate

128. See Decker, supra note 103, at 1968–69; Leib, supra note 3, at 907
(discussing “localist” statutory interpretation).
129. See Decker, supra note 103, at 1978 (discussing experimentalism in local
common law); Leib, supra note 3, at 907.
130. See Decker, supra note 103, at 1968–69 (discussing factors that make
appeals from lower courts rare).
131. See id. at 1968; Shanahan, Carpenter & Mark, A Dangerous Thing?,
supra note 40, at 1373 (discussing the importance of law reform activity, including
appeals, in state civil courts and arguing that such activity is rare where parties lack full
lawyer representation).
132. See, e.g., EINER ELHAUGE, STATUTORY DEFAULT RULES: HOW TO
INTERPRET UNCLEAR LEGISLATION 3 (2008).
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courts cannot anticipate the breadth of legal and factual situations faced
by state court judges, and a low level of appellate activity in many
areas of law likely compounds the problem.133
Procedural law can also be static at the state level. Many states
modeled their civil procedure codes after the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure, a framework that clearly does not contemplate pro se
litigation.134 We know of no state that has updated its civil procedure
code to account for the new pro se majority.
The mismatch between static formal law and the dynamic needs of
the state courtroom means we must re-think how to study the way law
shapes judicial behavior, and how judges in turn shape the law. This
includes fundamental questions about what law is, and about the roles
of common law and unwritten norms in our modern court system.
While some have argued that common law judging is fading in federal
courts, research may reveal a very different story in state courts, where
highly local common law may be the major form of law
development.135 Thus, a core area for future research is understanding
the interplay between static formal law and dynamic informal law in
state civil courts. Do judges perceive a need for more attuned formal
law? Has informal law taken on a quasi-formal role with characteristics
of transparency and consistency, or is the landscape one of individual
ad hoc judicial behavior? How do the questions about judicial learning
posed above interact with this process?
Questions about state court decision making should focus not only
on how judges apply existing law, but also on how they make choices
133. See Decker, supra note 103, at 1968–69; Leib, supra note 3, at 907.
134. A comprehensive analysis from 1986 found 23 jurisdictions had wholly
replicated the Federal Rules and another ten had adopted them in modified form, while
18 states’ procedural rules were “substantially dissimilar” from the Federal Rules. An
updated analysis published in 2003 showed that many of the 33 states with civil
procedure codes modeled after the Federal Rules had not chosen to keep up with the
evolution of the Federal Rules by adopting amendments. The study concluded that
“[f]ederal influence on state procedure . . . remains substantial, and important.” See
John B. Oakley, A Fresh Look at the Federal Rules in State Courts, 3 NEV. L.J. 354,
356–58, 383 (2002/2003) (citing John B. Oakley & Arthur F. Coon, The Federal Rules
in State Courts: A Survey of State Court Systems of Civil Procedure, 61 WASH. L. REV.
1367 (1986)). See also Stephen N. Subrin & Thomas O. Main, Braking the Rules: Why
State Courts Should Not Replicate Amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure,
67 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 501, 516 (2016) (“Because states have not adopted the
amendments to the Federal Rules, navigating the procedure in the state courts is like
walking through a time machine that transports one to an earlier era of federal
procedure.”). For an example of a state court where formal civil procedure rules apply
but are not followed by the court, see Steinberg, Informal, supra note 62.
135. See Neal Devins & David Klein, The Vanishing Common Law Judge, 165
U. PA. L. REV. 595, 600 (2017).
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in the absence of law. Another variation of these questions is how
judges face the pro se reality of not being briefed on applicable law by
lawyers on both sides of the case.136 The absence of this informational
mechanism may mean that, in some cases, judges simply may not know
(or may misunderstand) what the law is and how it applies in a given
case, and there is no person in the system to observe or challenge that
outcome. This also raises questions about how other actors in the court
ecosystem may play different, unexpected roles in the face of static
written law.
Though some scholars, notably Annie Decker and Ethan Lieb,
have written on the development of law in lower trial courts, the
volume of work in this area is miniscule in comparison to the need for
theory and research.137 In the application and development of law in
state civil courts, a massive field of potential scholarship is almost
entirely unexplored. We hope scholars will take up the task of
describing and theorizing the relationship between formal law, judicial
decision making, and the work of state courts.
CONCLUSION
We hope many readers are curious enough to head down to their
local courthouse for a first-hand glimpse of the mostly unexplored and
largest side of our civil justice system. In this article, we have sketched
the outlines of what you will find on that court’s civil dockets—swaths
of unrepresented people, the occasional lawyer, and busy, underresourced judges. We have also identified elements you may not see at
all, such as traditional adversary process, well-developed legal and
factual arguments, extensive motion practice, and rigorous application
of formal law. In drawing attention to state civil courts and judges, our
core goal is to critique and call for an end to the status quo, where such
courts are almost entirely ignored as sites for scholarly research, most
notably by legal scholars.
Without question, state civil courts have fundamentally
transformed over the past three decades. Where nearly every party was
once represented by counsel, today, the vast majority of litigants are
pro se. The adversary system, which depends on lawyers to drive
litigation, does not function as intended in courts where lawyers are
mostly absent. Even the core work of civil courts has shifted, with an
136. Paris R. Baldacci, A Full and Fair Hearing: The Role of the ALJ in
Assisting the Pro Se Litigant, 27 J. NAT'L ASS’N ADMIN. L. JUDICIARY 447, 490
(2007).
137. See Decker, supra note 103, at 1969; Leib, supra note 3, at 907–08.
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increase in the proportion of cases involving debt collection,
foreclosure, and landlord/tenant disputes.
The transformation of state courts is astonishingly easy to observe,
but our ignorance about its nature, causes, and effects, is hard to
overstate. Legal scholarship is ripe with a range of empirical and
normative work on courts and judges, but this work focuses almost
exclusively on federal courts and appellate matters. And in most states
and localities, data collection is spotty at best. In fact, a single
nonprofit organization, the National Center, has (through dogged
efforts) generated almost all of the available data on state courts.
If most of what we believe about civil courts and judges is based
on the federal model, it follows that we know too little about the
operation of law and justice on the ground, to say nothing of the courts
that are most relevant and important to ordinary people. Most people
will go a lifetime without setting foot in a federal court or being
involved in any way in federal litigation, but in more than 16 million
cases each year, Americans face the complexity of civil litigation
without a lawyer—all of them in state courts.
Given the dearth of scholarship on state civil courts and judges,
particularly in a time of growing legal empiricism and burgeoning
access to justice research, we have called for a new research agenda
focused on state courts and judges and suggested a theoretical
framework to guide this work. This framework is grounded in the new
pro se reality and recognizes four critical ways that this reality should
inform the study of state courts, with a focus on the judicial role: (1)
the adversarial system has broken down; (2) in-person interactions with
judges are commonplace; (3) the judicial role is ethically ambiguous;
and (4) written law is largely static while state courts are dynamic.
Finally, we have offered research questions based on this framework.
As we call for others to engage in this research, we perform the
work ourselves. Each of us has a history of studying state courts, and
we are now working together on a long-term, multi-jurisdictional
research project aimed at gaining a comparative picture of judicial
behavior in majority pro se state courts. The study, which is the first of
its kind, collects comparative data from state trial courts in three U.S.
cities. The data include courtroom observations and interviews with
judges, court staff, and staff from nonprofit organizations who work in
court-based pro se assistance programs.
In calling for more research, we do not wish to stifle the ongoing
development of access to justice interventions and other court reform
efforts. Reform and experimentation aimed at improving our civil
justice system can and should continue. Our hope is that future research
will inform the conversation around access to justice and state court
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reform. Ideally, we will see an ongoing, iterative process of research,
program development, implementation, and testing in the arena of
access to justice reform.
In addition to informing the access to justice conversation, the
implications of future research on state courts and judges will surely
reach beyond the pro se state court context to address broader concerns
about governance, law, and justice. Future learning from state court
research should inform discussions about institutional design, the role
of courts in democracy, federalism, and the rule of law, to name a few.
We urge scholars to join in the critical project of data collection
and theoretical development focused on state civil courts and judges.
Existing theories about judging, the development of law, and the
operation of civil justice can and should be re-evaluated through
rigorous, ongoing research in state civil courts. Such scholarship holds
the promise of advancing knowledge and understanding about American
civil justice while informing new policies and practices to improve it.
Nearly all judicial activity in the United States takes place in state
civil courts. Individuals and businesses of all types—from a corporation
seeking payment on a debt, to a tenant facing eviction, to victim of
violence in need of protection from abuse—depend on state courts and
judges for conflict resolution and rights enforcement. Today, as state
courts face unprecedented pressure from the growing pro se majority, it
is time for a new focus on understanding these essential civil justice
institutions and decision makers. We have neglected this project for far
too long.

